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Psychology
Risk-Sensitivity and Predictors of Choice Preference: Parenting, Addiction, and 
Dispositional Variables
Director: Allen Szalda-Petree, Ph.D.
The goal of this study was to assess the sensitivity of males and females to 
variation in reward amount under winning and losing conditions. Winning and 
losing were analogues to a negative and positive budget within the behavioral 
ecology model of the daily energy budget. Participants were asked to choose 
between the two choice options, one yielding a fixed reward amount and the 
other with a variable reward, while both options yield an equal mean reward for 
the duration of the session. During the task, the participant logged on to the 
Internet in order to play against an assumed competitor. The five hypotheses for 
the study were as follows: 1) Under the winning condition, males and females 
would demonstrate risk-aversion and under the losing condition males would 
exhibit risk-prone behavior, while females would remain risk-averse, although 
less risk-averse than in the positive budget. 2) Participants with children would 
demonstrate greater risk-sensitivity than those without children. 3) Females 
unconstrained by hormones and ovulating during the time of the task would 
demonstrate the greatest risk-aversion. 4) Individuals who report greater 
substance use would be more risk-sensitive than non-users. 5) Dimensions from 
the NEO-PI R would be predictive of choice preference.
The results support hypothesis one, males did demonstrate risk-sensitive 
behavior under both the negative and the positive budget conditions and the 
females exhibited risk-averse behavior within the negative budget condition. 
There were no statistically significant correlations between choice patterns and 
ovulation, substance use, or domain scores on the NEO-PI R.
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Introduction
The conditions under which humans take risks have been widely debated. 
Perhaps one of the first to formally observe risk-preference outcomes was the 
Swiss mathematician Daniel Bernoulli. Bernoulli posited that individuals prefer 
one alternative over another in order to maximize the value or utility of the 
options available (Lopes, 1984). There are numerous theories and models 
targeting choice behavior, all of which address this important question of why a 
decision maker selects one choice over another. In the natural environment, it is 
adaptive for choosing (foraging) organisms to select the food patch or resource 
option that best suits their needs. The selection of the optimal choice will ensure 
the forager's survival. Traditionally, the term "foraging" within the ecological 
literature refers to the allocation of food by nonhuman animals. However, 
foraging research has merged the fields of psychology and ecology and a more 
flexible definition has been adopted. The term "foraging" in the context of this 
paper will refer to the search, selection, and seizure of any desirable resource by 
human or nonhuman animals. The foraging choices under economic 
circumstances, mate selection, or within the context of something as seemingly 
trivial as finding a place to park one's car is of significance, it may be telling of 
more distal explanations of behavior. In all of these examples, one choice against 
all alternatives will be of greater value, the selection of that choice is contingent 
upon the perceived costs and the weighted benefits of that choice. In other 
words, the rewards of each choice are variable and it is that variability of
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outcomes that makes one choice riskier than another. The sensitivity of the 
forager to variability will dictate the strategy employed by the individual in 
making their choice selection. It is the sensitivity of the choosing organism to 
variability in reward options that is of interest in this study. The decision to 
select a choice yielding a fixed or variable outcome may provide further insight 
into the underlying mechanisms of choice behavior from an evolutionary 
perspective. Those models that assume that foraging behavior and choice 
preference for a particular patch or food option is the result of evolutionary 
pressures and fitness consequences are referred to as functional models. In 
contrast, mechanistic models are those that explain foraging behavior and choice 
preferences in terms of psychological processes like learning and perception. 
This does not mean that these behaviors are not the consequence of evolutionary 
adaptation, but mechanistic models do not assume that evolution and fitness 
functions assert direct pressure on the foraging behaviors (Bateson & Kacelnik, 
1998). All foraging models can be explained in relation to functional and 
mechanistic terms.
Animal Models of Choice
Virtually all animal models are functional models. Therefore it is 
important to appreciate that when choice behavior is applied to "risk," it means 
something different than the more colloquial usage. "Risk" generally refers to a 
continuum of danger or peril, in comparative, behavioral biology and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
psychology "risk" is referred to as the unpredictable, variable outcome that may 
maximize or minimize the fitness of a particular organism.
Optimal Foraging Theory (OFT). Optimal foraging theory, a functional 
model, suggests that foraging strategies show heritable variation, a consequence 
of evolutionary pressure and that natural selection will favor those foraging 
strategies that offer maximum fitness (Pyke, G. H., Pulliam, H. R., & Charnov, E. 
L., 1977). In theory, the forager's choice behavior will always maximize or 
minimize resource exploitation, consistent with the risk-reward relationship 
between the following factors: currency (energy gain), time (search and 
handling) and solving for the option yielding the optimal cost-benefit outcome. 
The ideal strategy for a forager is dependent upon the individual needs of that 
organism. Schoener (1971) predicted that if an organism has a static amount of 
time with which to quarry resources and if the fitness of the forager increases 
continually in conjunction with nourishment obtained, then the organism would 
be an energy-maximizer. Yet, if an organism requires time to perform other 
activities and the fitness of the animal does not increase, such that the amount of 
energy useful to the organism is fixed, then the forager is referred to as an energy- 
minimizer. Mellgren, Misasi, and Brown (1984) provided limited evidence to 
support the optimal foraging model by manipulating the travel requirements for 
food acquisition by two rats utilizing various patches with differing food 
densities in each patch (a sandbox). The purpose of this experiment was to 
assess how environmental constraints operate to affect the foraging behavior of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
an optimal forager. One of the two subjects demonstrated an increase in the 
number of food items harvested from a given patch. The increase in harvested 
food items also demonstrated an increase in the amount of time spent utilizing a 
given area as travel requirements from patch to patch increased, thus providing 
some support for the optimal foraging model.
Marginal Value Theorem. Charnov's marginal value theorem asserts that 
while a foraging organism is in a given resource patch, the food or resource 
intake for that patch will decrease in relation to the amount of time spent there 
(1976). Consistent with optimal foraging theory, the marginal value theorem 
asserts that the forager is assumed to make decisions in an effort to maximize the 
net rate of energy income during any given foraging episode. Thus, the 
important question becomes one of departure or the "giving up time." It is 
assumed that the forager will leave when the marginal capture rate of a patch 
drops to the average capture rate for that habitat (Charnov, 1976). The formula 
can be written as an energy balance equation:
En = E Pi-gi(Ti) -  t-Er 
t + EPi-Ti
Pi is the proportion of the visited patches that are of a given type, Et represents
the energy cost for inter-patch traveling, gi(Ti) is the cost of searching for the 
desirable resource (e.g. food), and Ti represents the time spent in a given patch 
(Charnov, 1976). The marginal value theorem assesses patch value and provides
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a way to predict the time spent searching within a patch and the time at which a 
given forager will depart or give up one patch for another.
Jensen's Inequality. Jensen's inequality provides a mathematical model for 
ascertaining a fitness value from a given amount of energetic sustenance. 
Typically models of risk-sensitivity rely on Jensen's inequality as an explanatory 
means of how risk affects foraging decisions (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1998). Risky 
foraging options are those that yield two or more possible resource values. How 
these resource values affect fitness can be ascertained through the following 
function: y  =f(x), where y  represents fitness and x represents the units food 
obtained from a foraging option. When applied to risk-sensitive foraging 
theory, one of the two foraging alternatives must be variable; this makes the 
foraging decision non-linear. If the relationship between the fitness value and 
the foraging decision is linear, then it would not be a risky decision since both 
options offer equal fitness.
The fitness value of a foraging option can be derived by averaging the 
income of a variable option (E{xJ) prior to the application of the fitness function, 
written as E{y} = f(E{x}). In addition, the average value of a foraging option can 
also be evaluated after applying the amount of value gleaned from the food 
attained, so that E{y} = E{f(x)}; however/(E{xJ) =f= E(/{x}), therein lies the crux of 
Jensen's inequality (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1998; Kirshenbaum, 2000). If fitness and 
food amounts are nonlinear and if averaging the outcomes from the variable 
options with the fitness values occurred following the application of the function
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
y  =f(x), then risk-sensitivity is predicted (Bateson & Kacenik, 1998). If the 
function of y  =f(x) is increasing and decelerating, then choice preference should 
demonstrate risk aversion. However, if y  =f(x) is decreasing and accelerating, 
then risk-prone behavior is predicted. Since optimal foraging theory models 
convert the average long term rates of gain by averaging outcomes before y  -f(x )  
has been applied, OFT does not predict risk-sensitivity. (Bateson & Kacelnik, 
1998).
Risk-Sensitive Foraging Theory. Risk-sensitive foraging theory (RSF), 
encompasses a number of other functional models, most of which are based on 
the following choice paradigm: an organism has two or more foraging options 
(or patches) that yield the same average amount of nourishment, but the 
variability of obtainable food differs from option to option (e.g. Batson and 
Kacelnik, 1995). If the forager always favors the constant or fixed option, its 
preference is referred to as risk-averse, but if the preference is for the option with 
greater variability, this behavior has been labeled risk-prone. Consistent with the 
model of optimal foraging theory, risk-sensitive foraging theory also assumes 
that animals will behave in ways that maximize their inclusive fitness. According 
to Smallwood (1996), the key contribution of risk-sensitive foraging theory is the 
sensitivity of organisms to variability in the reward rate and the preference of 
one foraging option over another in relation to the energetic gain and loss by the 
organism. In addition, the variability with respect to the amount or to the time to 
reward delivery is variable about the mean.
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Whether the forager is in a positive or a negative energy slope will be predictive 
of risk strategy, averse or prone. The negative or positive energetic slope is the 
organism's daily energy budget.
Daily Energy Budget, In a natural stochastic environment, food availability 
is variable, as is the interval of time between the search and the utilization of a 
given resource. The foraging choices of an organism may reflect where the 
animal falls on its energetic continuum. This continuum, one's positive or 
negative energy store is referred to as the daily energy budget. The selection of 
a more variable option reveals a higher rate of energy production (caloric) than 
consumption by the organism, whereas the selection of a less variable option 
demonstrates the opposite. When the average energy intake from either the 
variable or fixed option exceeds the needs of the animal, the energy budget rule 
predicts that the animal will prefer the less variable option (Smallwood, &
Carter, 1966). The daily energy budget is one of the most tested predictions 
within foraging research with a subject base that has a representation of virtually 
all classes, examples include nectarivorous birds (e.g. Carter & Dill, 1990; Carter, 
1991; Pimm, 1978; Wunderle, J. M., Santa Castro, S., & Fetcher, N., 1987), 
nectarivorous insects (e.g. Real, 1980; Real, L., Ott,}., and Shvereine, E., 1982; 
Waddington, K. D. 1995;) gravinous birds (e.g. Bateson & Kacelnik, 1997; Caraco, 
1980,1981,1983,1990; Case, D. A.; Nichols, P., & Fantino, E., 1995; Hamm & 
Shettleworth, 1987; Tuttle, E. F., Wulfson, L., & Caraco, T. 1990), migratory birds 
(e.g. Moore & Simm, 1986), cichlid fish (e.g. Roche, Dravet, Bolyard, & Rowland,
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1998; Young, Clayton, & Barnard, 1990), adult humans (e.g. Pietras & 
Hackenberg, 2001), and rodents (e.g. Barnard & Brown, 1985; Kirshenbaum et al., 
2000). Caraco et al. (1980) tested the hypothesized relationship between expected 
daily energy budgets and sensitivity to the mean and variance of resource 
amount using yellow-eyed juncos and dark-eyed juncos (1981) and found that 
risk-preferences could be predicted as a result of whether the birds had obtained 
sufficient daily nourishment. The juncos adapted their foraging strategies 
under different conditions. They exhibited risk-averse behavior when they 
succeeded in accommodating their energy requirement, but modified that 
behavior in a more risk-prone manner when they were behind in fulfilling their 
daily energy requirement.
Molar Maximization Theory. One model of the daily energy budget, molar 
maximization theory, predicts that an organism will maximize the probability of 
obtaining enough food to meet the energetic costs within the specific foraging 
constraints. Therefore, the preference for one option over another reflects a 
forager's maximum resource requirements per unit time. A mathematical model 
of molar maximization, or the z-score model, proposed by Stephens and Charnov 
(1982) posits that risk-sensitivity may be conceptualized in terms of starvation 
due to energetic deficits. For organisms with exceptionally high metabolic needs, 
operating at an energy shortage could lead to starvation. If the choice options 
lead to starvation or survival, risk-sensitive foragers reduce the probability of 
starvation, such that z represents the foraging constant or the predictive behavior
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of risk-averse or risk-prone strategy use. The formula can be interpreted as 
follows:
z = (R-u)/s
where u is the mean food reward, s is the standard deviation of food reward, 
and R is the forager's energetic requirement. The utility of this model is in the 
predictive value of measuring a forager's behavior. Manipulations of variability 
in reward quantity and delay to reward have demonstrated differences in risk- 
preference. Under conditions of varying delay, foragers are risk-prone. 
Conversely, when the variability is in reward amount, foraging behavior is risk- 
averse. This illustrates the importance of timing as an element in risk-sensitivity 
as well as reward magnitude (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Reboreda and 
Kacelnik, 1991). When food contributes linearly to reproductive success, an 
animal foraging over an extended period of time should maximize its mean net 
rate of energetic gain (McNamara, 1996).
Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET). Unlike the fore-mentioned models, scalar 
expectancy theory is a mechanistic model. SET asserts that risk-sensitivity is the 
result of perceptual processes and associative learning. Although reward 
amount is important, time is also of value when interpreting one's foraging 
decisions. The weighting of the various foraging options will differ based on the 
differential time between search and food acquisition, and the handling time of 
the food in relation to the ingestion of the prey or food item. The intervals 
between meals are often referred to as the inter-capture interval, where "capture"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
refers to the ingestion of the food. Weber's Law asserts that the just noticeable 
(minimum) difference in prey density (prey patches as analogues to stimuli) 
required to see two prey patches as different is proportional to the mean value of 
the two prey patch options. If a forager expects no variability in prey density it 
will register a value within the range of the true density value plus or minus one 
just noticeable difference, thereby constructing a distribution of subjective 
variability based on the individual forager's perceptions of prey density.
Weber's Law presents a cognitive component, which is memory, the memory of 
previous prey density in relation to what is currently experienced (Kacelnick & 
Bateson, 1996).
A modified version of Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET), a continuation of 
Weber's Law applied to foraging theory, suggests that a stimulus followed by a 
variable delay to food or a desired resource will be remembered as the 
combination of the delays in relation to the amount of food yielded after each 
time interval. It is expected then that foragers will choose between two options 
based on a memory representation for each delay or amount. When a 
conditioned stimulus (CS) is presented to a subject, it creates a memory trace that 
decays with time until the presentation of the unconditioned stimulus (US). 
Following a reinforced trial, a value is attributed to the CS-US pair and the 
memory trace of the CS decays in a hyperbolic manner. The hyperbolic decay 
suggests that when mean delays are equivalent, a CS followed by a variable 
delay to the onset of the US will be more valued than a fixed CS-US delay pair
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Kirshenbaum, 2000). SET predicts that variability in delay will be preferred to a 
constant delay to reinforcement and that a fixed reward amount will be preferred 
to variable reinforcement (Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996). In other words, risk-prone 
behavior should be expected when delay is manipulated and risk-averse 
behavior when amount is manipulated.
A problem with the SET model is that it is difficult to predict using an 
energy budget manipulation because the delay to reward in energy budget 
manipulations are based on the forager's success in allocating resources, which 
are typically always variable. In addition, the daily energy budget model is 
based on the variability of reward, which according to SET should be predictive 
of risk-aversion. But the delays are generally also variable, which predicts risk- 
prone behavior, so applying SET in daily energy budget manipulations can be 
problematic. These delay constraints are of central importance in self-control 
studies as well; the self-control manipulations are also based on the idea of 
variable and fixed delays in relation to reward amount.
Self Control Studies
A self-controlled decision is generally defined as the choice of a larger, 
more delayed reinforcer over a smaller, less delayed reinforcer. Conversely, an 
impulsive decision is the choice of a smaller; less delayed reinforcer over the 
larger more delayed option. In self-control research, molar maximization theory 
poorly predicts performance and although self-control studies are not analogous 
to risk-sensitivity, they do apply the same principles of choice, the selection of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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one option yielding greater energetic gain than another. Self-control research is 
relevant to work in risk-sensitivity because similar mechanisms are addressed. 
For example, one might expect those species that demonstrate a greater degree of 
self-control to also conform more to the daily energy budget model of risk- 
sensitivity. Those species that exhibit self-control would be expected to be risk- 
averse under all conditions, except those that reflect an extremely negative 
energy budget where not risking would ensure death or extreme loss of energy.
A number of studies have addressed the self-control behavior of rats 
(Tobin, Chelonis & Logue, 1993; Van Haaren, Van Hest, & Van De Poll, 1988) 
primates (Anderson, Awazu, & Fujita, 2000; Tobin, Logue, Chelonis & 
Ackerman, 1996), pigeons (Logue, Pena-Correal, Mauro, 1984; 1985; Mazur & 
Logue, 1978), and humans both in adults (Forzano & Logue, 1992; Kirk & Logue, 
1996; Logue & Pena-Correal, Rodriguez, & Kabela, 1986; Logue & King, 1991) 
and children (Logue & Chavarro, 1992; Miller & Weinstein, 1978). Pigeons and 
rats generally select the impulsive option within a self-control paradigm. While 
primates, both human and nonhuman are considered self-controlled in decision­
making situations, female hominids typically choose self-controlled options 
slightly more than males (Logue & Chavarro, 1992). Historically self-control 
research has focused on the delay to reinforcement and the quantitative amount 
of reward offered as the most critical components of behavior, while response 
effort has been more conservatively addressed. The fundamental assumption 
underlying the inclusion of an effort manipulation is that by increasing response
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effort, self-control will also increase. Theoretically, self-control should increase 
with the addition of an effort requirement because the greater response effort 
taxes the individual of their energy surplus. The self-controlled option would 
then promote energy conservation and maximization of reward or 
reinforcement. Chelonis, Logue, Sheehy, & Mao (1998) have demonstrated that 
rats typically increase self-controlled choices as response effort increases within 
0.8 N of force, as does the response latency. In contrast, Velkey (1995) applied an 
effort manipulation to an experiment using running wheels as the choice 
manipulanda with two different treatment conditions. The first treatment 
allowed for the concurrent operation of two different variable interval schedules. 
In this experiment the rats failed to achieve self-control. In the second treatment, 
the choices in the higher effort conditions were not significantly less impulsive 
than those from the low effort condition, but were not self-controlled responses. 
Social-Cognitive Models of Choice
Analogous models of foraging theory and risk behavior can be found in 
economics, social psychology and sociology. These models are not defined in 
terms of functional etiology as are the comparative models. Instead these models 
assert that choice is the result of social and or cognitive factors, therefore these 
models are all mechanistic. Economic models of risk, uncertainty and decision­
making generally stem from the expected utility theory proposed by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1964).
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Expected utility theory is based on a set of axioms, which offer criteria for 
the rationality of choice. The utility of a risky prospect is equal to the expected 
utility of its weighted probability outcomes, such that a rational decision-maker 
will prefer the prospect in a decision that yields the highest expected utility, 
provided that the decision-maker is rational and consistent in their selections 
(Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D., 1981; Von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O., 1964).
Prospect Theory. Prospect theory is essentially a modification of the 
expected utility theory, however noting the violations of its assumptions like the 
certainty effect or those choice preferences (e.g. transivity of preferences) that do not 
necessarily yield the highest expected utility. An example of such a violation is 
provided by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), given the option of selecting Choice 
A, which provides a 50% chance of winning a three week tour of England, France 
and Italy and selecting Choice B, which affords a one-week tour of England with 
certainty, 78% of a 72-person sample selected the more probable choice. Yet 
when the probabilities were further narrowed, the transitivity of preferences axiom 
of the expected utility theory was violated, using the same sample and same 
choices but with narrower probabilities such that selecting Choice A, provided a 
5% chance of winning a three week tour of England, France and Italy and 
selecting Choice B, afforded 10% chance of winning a one-week tour of England, 
67% percent of the participants selected the less probable choice. However, it can 
be argued that this is in fact not a violation of the transivity of preference axiom 
because the options in the two paradigms are not equivalent. In the first option,
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there is a certain probability and a 0.5 probability of gain. In the second option, 
the combined probability of gain is only 0.15, suggesting that subjects or 
decision-makers may be assessing the likelihood of gaining anything. If one does 
not believe they will come away with a gain, then there is nothing to be lost in 
selecting the higher reward condition. This preference switch is also referred to 
as the reflection effect, such that if the probabilities do not change, the two 
preferences are a reflection of one another. The reflection effect is analogous 
with respect to mean reward, the idea of a forager switching from a risk-averse 
to a risk-prone choice strategy. Risk-sensitive foraging theory does have a more 
subjective component just as this model of expected utility. The choice of the 
variable rewards patch or the constant food patch will be selected based on the 
organism's energetic requirements. If the animal requires little to satisfy its 
energetic necessities, then choose the constant option, but if the animal is at an 
energetic deficit, then choose the variable option. This choice between the two 
foraging strategies will be a subjective process of energetic interpretation. Utility 
and prospect theories are analogous to the biological foraging models. They all 
predict the maximization of gain and the minimization of loss in a decision 
dictated by uncertainty; nevertheless they cannot be entirely analogous since 
individuals foraging for food resources are often in the context of a starvation 
situation.
Security-Potential/Aspiration Theory (SP/A). The security- 
potential/ aspiration theory (SP/A) asserts that individuals tend to select either a
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low risk with a small outcome or they exploit the potential in a given situation by 
attempting to obtain the best results; which are then subject to the interpretation 
of the decision-maker. The smallest outcome that a person deems acceptable will 
influence one's level of risk taking (Lopes, L.L., 1983; 1984; 1987; Schneider & 
Lopes, 1968). Wang (1996) demonstrated that adults are more willing to select a 
riskier choice option if the lesser outcome is below their minimum aspiration 
level. SP/A  recognizes individual differences and variability in choice more 
than the preceding utility models. SP/A addresses the idea that those with a 
lower aspiration level are likely security-seekers, who are more motivated to 
play it safe than to take larger risks. This security-seeking behavior is 
comparable to the risk-averse organism in foraging theory, such that the 
evaluation of the attained resource or potential is sufficient to warrant a more 
conservative risk strategy, in the case of a forager, the lesser variance option.
Bounded Risk Distribution Model. Wang's (2002) Bounded Risk Distribution 
Model is the most likely candidate for merging the social cognitive models with 
the animal models of risk behavior as it applies to foraging. Wang (2002) asserts 
that the risk-taker must consider the highest mean expected value (MEV) of a 
choice option as well as the positive and negative variation from the MEV 
against task-specific goals and mean requirements. In addition, the mean 
requirement should vary depending upon the social and ecological context.
The Bounded Risk Distribution Model is consistent with the relevant 
concepts from foraging theories and emphasizes the relationship between mean
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expected value, variation within the expected outcomes (risk distributions), the 
mean requirement (MR) of the organism, and the goal setting bounded by the 
task within the social and ecological environment. It is the mean expected value 
and the mean requirement that dictate the choice strategy employed by the 
organism. Therefore, if the mean expected value is above the task-relevant mean 
requirement then the forager will demonstrate risk-averse behavior. In contrast, 
if the MEV of a choice option is below the MR, then the organism will choose a 
variance-seeking strategy.
Although, there are some exceptions to the MEV-MR predictions, the first 
occurs when the variance in the expected outcomes fails to provide the mean 
requirement or goal, then the organism is expected to be risk-averse in order to 
maintain their current resource position (Wang 2002). When a chooser's mean 
requirement is above the range of mean plus variance, then they should abandon 
all resource options and pursue better alternatives. This prediction is analogous 
to the marginal value theorem within optimal foraging theory. Finally, if the 
foraging organism's mean requirement or cost of choosing the high variance 
option is exceptionally low, then given that the negative consequences of this 
choice are minimal, the forager should be variance seeking to maximize their net 
return. This model merges principles within optimal foraging theory, risk- 
sensitive foraging theory, and individual differences in perception from the 
security-potential aspiration theory.
Sex Differences in Choice Behavior
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Another variable to consider in risk-taking behavior is that of sex. Tooby 
and Cosmides (1990) make the case that human nature, which they define as 
species-typical collections of complex psychological adaptations are the same 
across races, ethnic groups, and classes. They assert that this generality within 
Homo sapiens is attributable to evolutionary genetics of sexual recombination. 
However, Tooby and Cosmides assert that males and females do demonstrate 
differences in their behavioral repertoire. In order to support sexual selection, a 
complex coordination between the physiological and the psychological systems 
of males and females has evolved. Given the differences inherent to males and 
females regarding parental investment from an evolutionary perspective, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that females will be more risk-averse than males. 
Females would have to choose foraging patches based not only on their own 
survival, but also on behalf of their young. A female may be more likely to select 
the conservative or safe foraging option unless death was eminent and therefore 
would be risk-averse under most conditions, except extreme negative budgets.
It could be argued that one would expect to see more dramatic differences in 
employed foraging strategies by females if she must maintain her own inclusive 
fitness. In theory, it would be more advantageous for females to select the risk- 
prone strategy only in times of extreme dearth. In spite of this, it is unlikely that 
a female would select a more variable food patch over a constant resource and 
risk the potential loss of her offspring unless choosing not to take the risky 
option ensured death.
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Slovic (1966) conducted a study involving a sample of 1,047 children 
ranging in age from 6-16. The children volunteered to play a game for the chance 
at winning M & M candies. The purpose of this study was to provide evidence 
for the validity of the masculinity-boldness stereotype by studying the influence 
of age and sex upon decision-making and youngsters' performance on a task 
involving risk. The results of this study specifically lend credence to the 
prediction that females would be more risk-averse than males. In the literature, 
Slovic's study has been colloquially referred to as "the toggle-switch study" 
(Kopfstein, 1973) because it utilized a switchboard with ten toggle switches. Out 
of the ten switches, one switch acted as a "disaster switch," such that the 
selection of this switch would result in the loss of their earned cache of M&Ms. It 
was impossible for the participant to tell which switch was the "disaster switch" 
so they had to flip the switches based on their mental assessment of the 
probability of flipping a non-disaster switch and adding a spoonful of M & Ms to 
their cache. Maximization would have been to take the risk of five pulls and 
then stop and collect the reward cache because after five pulls, the probability of 
switching the disaster toggle would be greater than a safe pull. Slovic's results 
indicated that females took less risk with M & M rewards than the boys. In 
addition, the caution exhibited by the girls (total average of 2.20 spoons) was an 
advantageous strategy; they earned more M & Ms than the boys (total average of 
1.84 spoons). The optimal performance strategy used by girls in this study is 
analogous to optimal foraging theory. The decision to stop flipping toggle
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switches may demonstrate probability monitoring and an evaluation of the cost 
to benefit relationship between continuing to risk and to quit while ahead. The 
optimal foraging strategy in this case was to quit half way through the task in 
order to maximize one's net gain prior to losing all of the M & M rewards. This 
is not counter to the daily energy budget rule because females may still exhibit 
risk-proneness under negative energy conditions, but in relation to males it will 
be less risk-prone. Although the aim of Slovic's research was to support the 
boldness stereotype, the "toggle-switch study" may have simply demonstrated 
conservative risk-taking on the part of the females in order to maximize their net 
gain.
Kass (1964) addressed decision-making behavior in children as a function 
of sex and probability preference as well. The sample consisted of 52 preschool 
and elementary school children evenly divided by sex. The task utilized three 
identical, simulated slot machines mounted side-by-side. A penny was required 
for operation of each machine. The machines were assigned probabilities of 1/1, 
with a very low reward; the second machine had a probability of 1/3 , with an 
intermediate reward amount and 1/8, with a high reward amount. The 
participants had free access to all three machines until they reached 210 trials, 
when they were asked to select the machine they liked best and play that one 
exclusively. At the onset of the session, the participants were given 14 pennies to 
use in play and were told that their earnings were exchangeable for prizes, the 
more money they won, the better the prize they could buy at the end. The
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results indicated a significant sex difference associated with low probability 
payoff and intermediate probability payoff. Boys made the greatest number of 
responses on the intermediate (1/3) and low probability (1/8) pay-offs and the 
least number of responses on the high probability pay-off machines (1/1). The 
results for the girls were completely opposite. They demonstrated a higher 
number of responses on the high probability pay-off machines (1/1) and the least 
on the intermediate (1/3) and low probability machines (1/8). Again, the 
differences between boys' choices and girls' choices here may be differences in 
sensitivity to maximization. Females may be more disciplined in their risk- 
taking as a consequence of perceived risk-reward values. Logue and Chavarro 
(1992) performed a choice experiment in which two options were offered to 
children of preschool age. The impulsive option was one sticker with no delay to 
reinforcement. Selection of the self-controlled option yielded three stickers with 
a 30 second wait. Although neither preschool boys nor the preschool girls 
behaved significantly more self-controlled than impulsive, the boys did choose 
the impulsive option significantly more than the preschool girls.
Differences in male and female choice preference are predicted for the 
current research proposal as well. The purpose of the proposed research is to 
investigate the patterns of human foraging behavior in a binary choice option 
using a manipulated energy budget. Pietras and Hackenberg (2001) provide the 
only published study of risk-sensitive foraging theory using a daily energy 
budget model with human subjects. Using a small-n design (n = 3), Pietras and
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Hackenberg (2001) were able to find risk-averse behavior under positive budget 
conditions and risk-prone behavior under negative conditions for two of the 
three subjects; the third did not demonstrate strong risk-sensitive biases. 
Although small-n designs are creditable and typical in comparative research, one 
of the goals of this study was to apply a group design to a computerized choice 
task. In addition, one of the benefits of utilizing a human subject pool is the 
ability of adults to describe their choice behavior and to provide further insight 
into the conditions with which they may select one risky option over an 
alternate.
Deditius-Island and Szalda-Petree (2002) conducted a between subjects 
experiment using male and female college students in a binary, computerized 
choice task. The experimental task was set up as a competitive game; the daily 
energy budget was manipulated by assigning participants to a winning or losing 
condition. The participant first experienced 10 forced choice trials with a 
"logging on to the Internet" screen, following the presentation of a "connected" 
screen, participants then engaged in the free-choice task. Participants were led to 
believe they were competing with another college student online for an 
undisclosed sum of money following the completion of the experiment. The free 
choice task consisted of a fixed and variable choice option with four status 
displays (winning or losing) after every fifteen trials. Although the participant 
was never privy to the where they were in relation to the conclusion of the task. 
In addition, the status bar was programmed to move along the point barometer,
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such that the bar never moved above the even line in the losing (negative 
budget) condition, nor did it move below the even line in the winning (positive 
budget) condition. Males in the positive budget group demonstrated a risk- 
averse bias while all other groups demonstrated risk-ambivalence. Bivariate 
correlations were computed to determine if age, counterbalance or time of day 
correlated with the proportion of risk-prone choices. There were no statistically 
significant correlations among these variables and the dependent variable. There 
were statistically significant differences between males and females in their 
choice preference, but the females did not demonstrate a statistically significant 
choice preference toward the fixed or variable option for this experimental task. 
The males demonstrated risk-averse behavior under a positive budget and less 
risk-averse behavior under a negative budget (Deditius-Island & Szalda-Petree, 
2002).
Humans are capable of going for long periods of time without eating due 
to relatively stable fat reserves. These reserves provide an unparalleled 
advantage for large mammals that are not necessarily available to most birds, 
fish, or smaller mammals. This may explain why the females in the Deditius- 
Island and Szalda-Petree study did not demonstrate risk-sensitive behavior 
under either the positive or negative budget condition (2002). There are four 
factors that were not addressed in the previous study that may be of value. The 
first, parenting status, may be a meaningful variable to consider, the energetic 
cost of parenting and the way in which participants change their perceptions of
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valued resources could influence the way in which they respond to variation in 
resource rewards. In parallel with parenting status is that of menses for the 
females. Gallup (1998) demonstrated that females report greater risk-taking 
behavior the further they are from ovulation and the greatest risk-aversion 
occurring in conjunction with ovulation. Gallup administered a survey that 
asked female participants to respond to questions about their daily behavior and 
sexual activity and about their method of contraception. Students taking birth 
control pills demonstrated little to no variation in their risk taking behavior as a 
function of menses phase, however those who were not on hormonal 
contraceptives decreased risky activity during ovulation. Menses was not a 
variable considered in the Deditius-Island and Szalda-Petree study (2002).
Another challenge for the current study is that of the negative budget 
condition. The losing condition within the competitive treatment did not 
necessarily take anything away from the participant when they lost. Unlike true 
negative budget conditions, energy is removed from a current bank of reserves. 
The money awarded to the winner under the experimental condition was a 
surplus of "energy" since the participants did not have the additional money at 
the inception of the task. A potential solution to this problem would be to 
provide a more analogous negative energy budget state by manipulating 
response effort or to disclose to the participants how much time they have 
remaining to accrue points. The problem with manipulating response effort 
within a human sample is that of variable strength and the problem of
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considerable body fat. Generally people have enough stored energy to prevent 
starvation or to prevent extreme hunger as a consequence of energy expenditure. 
Therefore manipulating response effort (physically) would create interpretation 
problems, since the likelihood of truly creating a negative energy state is 
improbable.
Human behavior is not static, nor is it consistent. Behavior can be 
influenced by context; this includes previous experience, timing of meal 
consumption, and the perception of the risk option. Personality factors may also 
contribute to choice preference, for instance if an individual has an "addictive 
personality," they may demonstrate less self-control or a higher need for 
sensation. Finally, addiction was also not addressed in the study by Deditius- 
Island and Szalda-Petree (2002). Substance abuse (specifically smoking and 
alcohol use) was addressed in the current study to determine if those individuals 
with substance problems demonstrate differential risk-preference in comparison 
to those without substance abuse. Rachlin (2000) asserts that individuals with 
addictions struggle with the delay to immediate gratification; therefore their self- 
control is thwarted by the desire for the removal of craving, an aversive stimulus. 
The elimination of craving in turn acts as negative reinforcement and thereby 
results in long-term behavioral changes with more impulsive patterns of 
behavior.
Given that the sample of interest is verbally adroit adults, a measure that 
demonstrates positive correlates of risk-sensitive behavior is of relevance.
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Deditius-Island and Szalda-Petree (2002) used Zuckerman's sensation seeking 
scales form V and VI (1994) in their choice task; however the study failed to find 
sensation-seeking correlates with choice preference. The current study employed 
a different personality measure in the pursuit of personality correlates of risk 
preference.
NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI R. Form S)
Costa and McCrae developed three personality measures based on the 
five-factor model (FFM) of personality traits: the NEO Personality Inventory 
(NEO-PI) (1985), the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R) (1995), and 
the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) (1992). The first personality measure 
the NEO-PI, measures the domains of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness (to 
experience), Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness with six facet scales for the 
domains of Neuroticism, Extraversion and Openness. The NEO-PI-R is the same 
as the NEO-PI with the inclusion of six facet scores for the other two remaining 
domains of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. The NEO-FFI is an abridged 
form of the NEO-PI-R; it offers a 60-items for the five domains only. The NEO- 
PI-R also has two forms: Form R, which consists of observer ratings with 240 
parallel items to Form S written in the third person for a peer or family member. 
The NEO-PI R Form S is a self-administered measure with 240 items that are 
appropriate for men and women of all ages (Costa & McCrae, 1992). This 
measure was selected for the second experiment based on the flexibility of the 
facet scales and the generality of the scale and the variety of research applications
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to which it can be used. This is typically not a scale used to measure 
psychopathology; it is used to measure self-concept and to provide actuality 
estimates of what an individual is truly like (Costa & McCrae, 1995). The NEO- 
PI R Form S may provide a valid and reliable means for the investigation of 
correlates between personality factors and choice behavior and how those 
personality dimensions may influence risk preferences in a foraging task. This 
measure was selected based on the broad applicability and flexibility of the scale 
and based on a reliability generalization conducted by Caruso (2000). Caruso 
(2000) showed consistent score reliability across all domains of the NEO-PI R, 
with the lowest reliability score at 0.75 and the highest for neuroticism at 0.83.
There were five hypotheses for this study, the first asserted that under the 
winning condition, (positive budget) males would demonstrate risk-aversion and 
under the losing condition (negative budget) risk-prone behavior. However, 
females would demonstrate risk-averse behavior under both the positive 
(winning) and the negative budget (losing) conditions with less risk-aversion in 
the negative budget condition. If the evolutionary explanation (i.e. parental 
investment theory) as posited by Trivers (1985) also applies to conditions of 
choice, females should behave conservatively. Natural selection likely favors 
those females who demonstrate conservation, as necessitated by maternal 
responsibility and high parental investment. Applied to risk, women should be 
risk-averse under modest cost conditions as well as under high stake conditions 
because she must account for another life.
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The remaining four hypotheses were all exploratory. The second 
hypothesis predicted that participants with children would demonstrate greater 
risk-sensitivity/ than those without children. This is essentially analogous to 
increasing the stakes; thereby changes in an energy budget should facilitate 
greater vacillations in foraging strategies among those individuals who are 
parents, in comparison to the pre-bred individuals. The third hypothesis 
asserted that females unconstrained by hormonal contraceptives would display 
the greatest risk aversion, especially those ovulating during the time of the task. 
The fourth hypothesis was based on studies of self-control and delay-to- 
gratification, we expected that participants with greater self-reported use of 
nicotine, caffeine, or alcohol would also demonstrate greater risk-sensitivity than 
non-users.
CAGE. The CAGE, the most widely studied self-report instrument for 
alcohol problems was used to assess substance use among the participants 
(Aertgeertz, Buntinx, Bande-Knops, Vandermeulen, Roelants, Ansoms, & Fevery, 
2000). The CAGE is a four-item measure that takes roughly one minute to 
complete. CAGE is an acronym for the following questions: 1) Have you ever felt 
you ought to Cut down on your drinking? 2) Have people Annoyed you by 
criticizing your drinking? 3) Have you ever felt bad or Guilty for your drinking? 
4) Have you ever had a drink first think in the morning as an Eye-opener? (Shields 
& Caruso, In Press). The CAGE was used as an alcohol use screen and a 
modified CAGE was used for tobacco and caffeine use as well. Finally, the fifth
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hypothesis addressed behavioral correlates of risk-sensitive foraging behavior 
within the domains of the NEO-PI-R. It was predicted that individuals who 
demonstrate higher risk-prone responding would also score high on the domain 
of extraversion and openness.
Method
Participants
Male (n = 90) and female (n = 145), psychology students from the 
Introductory Psychology Course subject pool were recruited for this task. Males 
mean age was 20, while the average age of female participants was 21 years. 
Apparatus
Two PC computers programmed using a Visual Basic 6.0 program and 
operating under the Windows 95 system with a serial mouse. Both computers 
were equipped with SV and the monitors were set at a resolution of 640 x 480 
pixels.
Procedure
Participants were met at an experimental room (measuring 2.55 x 3.57 m), 
where two computers were situated side-by-side and separated by a partition 1.8 
m in height. The experimental room accommodated two participants per one- 
hour experimental session. Participants read and signed a University of 
Montana informed consent sheet. Participant numbers, age, sex, number of 
children, tobacco use, alcohol and caffeine consumption were entered into a
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subject record form presented on the computer screen prior to the start of the 
computer task.
The experimental task was divided into two phases, 10 forced-choice trials 
and five blocks of 15 free-choice trials, totaling 75 free-choice trials in all. In both 
types of trials, a choice was recorded following three mouse-clicks on the 
stimulus box. Given the ease of selection, three clicks designated a commitment 
to the choice and also allowed the participant an opportunity to change their 
choice selection. When the participants read the instructions to the forced choice 
trials (see Appendix), they clicked on an icon at the bottom of their participant 
record form labeled "start," thereby initiating the forced-choice trials. The 
forced choice trials consisted of single choice option presentation per trial, once a 
choice was made, the point value for that choice was displayed for 3-seconds and 
the next trial commenced. Once all ten trials were completed, a second 
instruction screen was presented (see Appendix). The second set of instructions 
informed the participants of the game objective: earn as many points as possible 
in order to beat your Internet competitor.
The experimental procedure utilized deception that created a competitive 
component for the task. In natural foraging environments, we are generally 
competing with conspecifics for desirable resources, therefore, it was anticipated 
that creating a competitive task would increase the saliency of the computer task. 
Students learned of the "competitor" in the free-choice instructions, which 
indicated that the participants would be competing for points with Introductory
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Psychology students from another University. Clicking on a start box at the 
bottom of the instructions initiated an Internet connecting screen with a 10- 
second count down to "log-on" with a linking designation. The connecting 
screen was modeled after Internet computer games where participants must link 
with others on the Internet to compete for high point designations. To increase 
the experimental realism of the competitor, the researchers told the participants 
during the logging on screen, "it may take a moment for your competitor to log 
on, as the other participants may have arrived to their designated appointment a 
couple minutes after you. If you have trouble logging on to the Internet please 
let me know." Once the connecting screen indicated that both participants were 
logged on, the participants were shown a status screen with a continuum bar 
indicating "EVEN" along a status barometer (see Figure 2) the free-choice trials 
were then presented.
The free choice trials were conducted in the same manner as the forced- 
choice trials except they provided simultaneous presentation of both choice 
options and the individual's participant number was visible along with the 
University of Montana's abbreviated letters, "UM" at the lower left hand comer 
of the screen. The competing participant's number (same as the UM subject) and 
a University designation of "WSU" were also visible in the lower right hand 
corner of the screen. A trial number indicator was also visible during the free- 
choice trials. The trial indicator represented the number of trials remaining while
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the participant made choice selections. Therefore the participant was always 
privy to how many trials were remaining in the task.
Participant selection of the variable option yielded 1 or 5 points, (p (1 
point) = .5 and p (5 points) = .5) whereas selection of the fixed option exclusively 
yielded 3 points (p (3 points) = 1.0). Feedback on relative performance to the 
supposed competitor was provided after blocks of 15 trials with the presentation 
of the status screen. Consequently there were four presentations of the status 
screen to coincide with each trial block of 15 trials. The location of the status bar 
along the winning or losing barometer presented "behind" or "ahead," 
depending on the participant's budget condition. To ensure believability of the 
manipulation localized movement of the status bar within the losing or winning 
gradient of the status barometer contributed to the perception of progress or 
decrement as a consequence of choice strategy. However, this status bar 
movement was programmed by the budget group designation and was not 
contingent on the participants' choice during the trials.
Participants were randomly assigned, in roughly equal numbers, to the 
two budget conditions. The side (left or right) presentation of the choice boxes 
were pseudo-randomized and counterbalanced by trial, whereas the choice box 
color (blue or yellow) was counterbalanced by participant for each randomly 
assigned option. Following the choice task, a computerized post-experimental 
questionnaire was presented and participants were asked to recall which choices 
they made more (blue vs. yellow) within each trial block. They were asked to
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rank their level of motivation on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 = not motivated, 3 = highly 
motivated) to beat their Internet competitor, how engaging they found the task 
on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 = bored, 3 = very engaged), if they found the instructions 
clear (yes or no), also if they chose one box overall more than another. For 
females, a contraceptive screen was presented asking the participants if they 
were currently using hormonal contraceptives and if they were not, to recall the 
first day of their last menses. Once these questions were completed, a thank you 
screen was presented and the participants were asked to complete the NEO-PI R 
form S using a test booklet and Scantron. Participants were told that winners in 
the choice task were entered into a weekly lottery for $100. Following data 
collection, the participants were verbally debriefed, or they were given a 
debriefing handout regarding the task.
Results
All statistical analyses of choice data were conducted using the proportion 
of risk-prone choices. The risk-prone proportion was calculated by dividing the 
number of variable option choices by the total number of trials excluding the first 
block of 15 trials (trials = 60). The first block of trials was excluded because the 
participants during that phase of the task were told they were even with their 
competitor. Menstrual cycle phase was determined using the forward cycle 
method (Grammar, 1993). The forward cycle method entails beginning at the 
participant's self-reported first day of menses and then to count forward to the 
test date. Although more invasive methods of determining ovulation can have
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somewhat better accuracy (e.g. Graham, Janssen, & Sanders, 2000; Petralia & 
Gallup, 2002), the forward cycle method has been used to roughly determine 
menses phase in a number of behavioral studies (e.g. Chavanne & Gallup, 1997; 
Grammar, 1993; Petralia & Gallup, 2002) and is sufficient for a preliminary 
investigation of menses phase and risk prone choices. Only women who fell 
within 13-16 days post-menses and were not using hormonal contraceptives 
were considered to be within their ovulatory phase, this is a conservative 
window given the variability of ovulation within a menses cycle.
Table 1 shows one-sample t-test results for the risk-prone proportion for 
each budget/ sex combination. Males demonstrated risk-sensitive behavior in 
both budget groups. Under the positive budget males demonstrated a risk-averse 
preference and under the negative budget a risk-prone preference. Females had a 
risk-averse orientation across both budgets but only the negative budget 
demonstrated a significant risk-averse preference. Additionally, a 2 (budget) x 2 
(sex) ANOVA was conducted using the proportion of risk-prone choices.
Results from the ANOVA revealed a main effect for Budget (F(l, 235) = 5.50, 
p < .05), no main effect for Sex (F(l, 235) = .608, p < .05), and a significant Budget 
x Sex interaction (F(l, 235) =11.23, p < .01) (see Figure 1). A post-hoc analysis of 
the interaction, using Tukey's F1SD (a =.05), revealed that the male/negative 
budget group was significantly more risk-prone than the male/ positive budget 
group and female/ negative budget group. All other pair-wise comparisons were 
not significantly different. Based on the above data, there is support for the first
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
hypothesis. As predicted, males were risk-averse in the positive budget and risk- 
prone in the negative budget and females were risk-averse in both budgets, 
albeit only significantly so in the negative budget.
Bivariate correlations were conducted to determine if age (r = -.237, 
p< .01), children (r = -.077, p< .05), substance use, or ovulation (r = .004, p< .05) 
correlated with the proportion of risk-prone choices. The only statistically 
significant correlation was between age and risk preference, according to the 
data, the older the subject the greater their risk-averse behavior.
For the CAGE responses, two groups were formed. Group one, 
represented clinically significant use of alcohol and by extension tobacco and 
caffeine. Group two included the nonclinical respondents. Clinical designations 
were determined by total scores of 2 or higher, while values less than 2 were 
categorized as non-clinical users. Clinical and nonclinical-use of the three 
substances were analyzed in an independent samples t-test with risk-prone 
choices as the test variable (see Table 11). Despite the evidence for the first 
hypothesis, these analyses fail to confirm the second, third, or fourth hypotheses.
The fifth hypothesis for the study predicted that one or more of the 
domain scales from the NEO-PI R form S would correlate with risk-preference. 
There were no significant correlations for any of the domain or facet scores for 
females and their proportion of risk-prone choices (see Table 3). Among the 
males, there were no significant correlations between the NEO-PI R domain 
scores and risk preference, but there were two significant facet scale correlations
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with the overall proportion of risk-prone choices. Activity (r = -.229, p < .05)/and 
tender-mindedness (r = -.217, p < .05) were both negatively correlated with risk 
prone choice. Low scorers on tender-mindedness are less moved by others' 
needs and by appeals to pity. They are considered more hardheaded and 
consider themselves realists and rational decision makers (Costa & McCrae, 
1992). Low scores on activity are considered leisurely and relaxed with regard to 
energy expenditure. Both of these facets scores do in fact adhere to the 
theoretical conception of risk-sensitive foraging theory given these correlations 
are negative, indicating that risk-prone responses are elevated; however, other 
facet scores that are not correlated with risk-prone behavior like excitement 
seeking would be anticipated. This makes the interpretation of the two facet 
correlations more difficult, given this, and the fact that the fifth hypothesis was 
restricted to the domains scores.
Score reliability can be eliminated as a potential cause for the poor 
predictive ability of the NEO-PI R for the choice behavior among our sample.
The unweighted mean (M = .85) values for the domain scores indicate that the 
NEO-PI R demonstrates good score reliability among this sample of college 
students. However, the combined score reliabilities are fair to poor for the facet 
scores. The reliability coefficients ranged from .46 to .80 (range -  .34) indicating 
substantial variability in the reliability of facet scores for the NEO-PI R (see Table 
3). It is relevant to note that the NEO-PI R did correlate with other variables 
other than risk preference, these include: ovulation and neuroticism 1, the facet
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score for anxiety (r = .296, p < .05), ovulation and openness to experience 1, the 
facet score for fantasy (r = -.302, p < .05).
Correlations between alcohol and facet and domain scores were also 
found, these include: neuroticism 1, the facet score for anxiety (r = .147, p < .05), 
neuroticism 2 (r = .183, p < .01), the facet score for angry hostility, neuroticism 4 
(r = .148, p < .05), the facet score for self consciousness, neuroticism 5 (r = .257, 
p < .01), the facet score for impulsiveness, and the domain score of neuroticism 
(r = .242, p < .01). Tobacco use correlated with neuroticism 5 (r = .129, p < .05), 
the facet score for impulsiveness, agreeableness 2 (r = -.146, p < .05), the facet 
score for straightforwardness, conscientiousness 1 (r = -.179, p < .01), the facet 
score for competence; conscientiousness 3 (r = -.200, p < .01), the facet score for 
dutifulness; conscientiousness 4 (r = -.182, p < .01), the facet score for 
achievement striving; conscientiousness 6 (r = -.187, p < .01), the facet score for 
deliberation, and the domain score of conscientiousness (r = -.219, p < .01). For 
frequencies of the domain and facet scores please refer to Tables 4-10.
There were also significant correlations within the facet and domain 
scores of the NEO-PI R. These results indicate that although the measures failed 
to predict choice patterns, there were in fact successful in predicting substance 
use for various personality constructs, particularly those within neuroticism 
(r = .242, p < .01). Based on previous studies utilizing the NEO-PI R for 
predicting substance use, substance abusers appear more neurotic than those in 
the norm group (McCormick, Dowd, Quirk, & Hernando Zegarra, 1998).
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Discussion
As predicted by hypothesis one, males and females demonstrated risk- 
sensitivity in their choice patterns. The males demonstrated a significant risk- 
prone bias under the negative budget and a significant risk-averse bias under the 
positive budget. Further, as predicted, the females were risk-averse under both 
conditions, although only significantly risk-averse under the negative budget, 
this is reversed from the expected directionality. Therefore hypothesis one is 
fully supported for the males, but only partially supported for the females. This 
is consistent with Pietras and Hackenberg's (2002) results, such that the one male 
and one female demonstrated risk-sensitivity and while the other female risk 
indifferent. Unlike Pietras and Hackenberg's results, this investigation of risk 
preference utilized a group design and although individual females in our 
sample did demonstrate risk-sensitive behavior within the two budgets, this 
sensitivity was not descriptive of the females as a whole.
One potential explanation for the female risk-sensitive behavior, 
specifically, more risk-averse in the negative budget, is that the competition and 
reward variables may not have been particularly salient for females. The 
Bounded Risk Distribution Model asserts that when variance in the expected 
outcomes fails to reach the mean requirement, then greater risk aversion will 
result. In addition, if the mean requirement is beyond the range of the mean plus 
variance relative to the mean requirement, then they should seek better 
alternatives. In either budget condition, the mean requirement is to win.
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In the losing condition (negative budget), the mean requirement (winning) is 
beyond the range of the mean plus variance, which predicts that the chooser will 
seek out better alternatives. In our task, the participant is unable to seek out 
alternatives, so the best strategy may be to maintain the status quo, which 
predicts risk-aversion. According to BRD, males did not employ the risk-averse 
strategy in the negative budget because the perceived cost of losing was likely 
more adverse. The competitive component of the task for the males may have 
had greater saliency and therefore greater investment in optimizing one's point 
cache. Assuming that parental investment theory (Trivers, 1985) as it relates to 
mating behavior, also applies to conditions of choice, females should behave 
conservatively. Natural selection likely favors those females who demonstrate 
conservation, as necessitated by maternal responsibility and high parental 
investment. Applied to risk, women should be risk-averse under modest cost 
conditions as well as under high stake conditions. Since our task may not have 
provided salient environmental cues for the females, risk-indifference occurred 
under the positive budget.
Another possible explanation for the females' reverse directionality is that 
the negative budget may be the only condition truly tapping into the risk- 
sensitive behavior. The positive budget does not result in a cost and the 
competitive component, although they are not significantly different, does not 
appear to be as salient for females as it was for males (see Table 10). If this is 
true and the lacks saliency for females, there are no disadvantages to choosing
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the variable option. In fact, even within the economic literature risk-indifference 
occurs under limited loss conditions and has been a problem for plausible 
explanation by the expected utility theory. Expected utility theory (EUT) 
predicts that risk-neutrality should occur under potentially economically 
important stakes (Rabin, 1999). Rabin (1999) has argued, "energy-maximizers are 
arbitrarily close to risk neutral when stakes are arbitrarily small." Risk-sensitive 
foraging theory accounts for this problem by invoking natural selection as the 
mechanism for variable choice preference under conditions of dearth, that 
"energy" as it is applied within the foraging literature represents caloric dearth. 
By extension, the application of caloric dearth to human primates is an unlikely 
problem, humans typically operate within a positive caloric energy budget. In 
addition, the concept of "credit" may inoculate one's sensitivity to money as a 
reasonable analogue to caloric energy. This is not true of time, there are few 
ways to earn "credit" for time and therefore the application of money is best 
replaced with unit of "energy." In an effort to adhere to the methodological 
precedent set by Pietras and Hackenberg's (2002) study in employing human 
subjects in a risk-sensitivity task, we maintained the points-for-money reward. 
Future studies of risk-sensitivity among human subjects would be wise to revise 
the current methodology by manipulating delay times instead of points.
The second hypothesis asserted that parents would be more risk-sensitive 
than pre-bred participants. Due to the limited number of parents within the 
subject pool, the relationship between parenting status and choice preference
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should be considered purely exploratory. There were only twenty-three parents 
within our sample of Psychology 100 students. For males, the negative budget 
condition did not have any parents and in the positive budget, there were only 
four, so the two groups could not be compared. Among the females, there were 
a total of nineteen parents between the two budget groups. The analysis of 
choice patterns by the twelve female parents within the positive budget revealed 
nonsignificant t-values. Therefore, it is difficult to say anything about the 
second hypothesis other than it was not supported potentially due to the limited 
number of subjects for comparison.
The remaining three exploratory hypotheses were also unsupported. 
Specifically, none of the domain scores for the NEO PI were significantly 
correlated with risk preference, nor was the modified CAGE for tobacco and 
caffeine use, or the CAGE for alcohol. For the sample of females within this 
study who did not use hormonal contraceptives, their choice patterns did not 
demonstrate significant correlations with risk preference. For ovulation and 
NEO-PI R correlations, there were two positively correlated facet scores (anxiety 
and fantasy) within the domain of neuroticism and openness to experience with 
ovulation. However, given that other domain and facet scale scores that one 
would expect to be predictive of ovulation (e.g. excitement seeking, tender- 
mindedness, extraversion, etc) did not correlate with ovulation it difficult to 
interpret these findings. In spite of the lack of correlational relationships 
between ovulation and the other facet scores, the relationship between fantasy
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and anxiety are directionally consistent with previous studies of risk and 
ovulation (e.g. Chavanne & Gallup, 1997; Grammar, 1993; Petralia & Gallup, 
2002). There are two potential reasons for limited results concerning the 
ovulation and NEO-PI R results, the first is limited sample. The second 
explanation may be that ovulatory phase within this sample of females is too 
variable to be measured using the forward method and consequently a more 
sensitive measure is necessary.
There are three potential explanations regarding the inability of the two 
personality measures (e.g. Sensation Seeking Scales from the first study and the 
NEO-PI R of the current study) to predict risk-sensitive behavior, the first is the 
evolutionary premise of risk-sensitivity. If risk-sensitive behavior is truly an 
evolved behavior as a consequence of natural selection, then it would stand to 
reason that the behavior should be unrelated to individual differences, it would 
be exclusively manipulated and thereby predicted as a consequence of the 
environmental constraints alone. A second explanation is that of semantics.
Personality measures claiming to predict risk taking and sensation seeking 
personalities are defining risk much differently. "Risk" in this context is defined 
as a sensitivity to peril or danger, one who is or is not risky or sensation seeking 
falls towards the ends of the risky or sensation seeking gradient, indicating they 
are less sensitive to danger or that they need greater environmental stimulation 
to be aroused. "Risk" in the context of foraging or risk-sensitive behavior, has 
little to do with sensitivity to danger; it is one's sensitivity to the unpredictable
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variability in an outcome (Zuckerman, 1994). The theory of risk-sensitivity 
asserts that the switching between choosing a constant option verses selecting 
variable options is fundamentally a part of survival constructs and that is the 
environment not the personality that draws on this behavioral strategy. Thereby 
the inclusion of a personality instrument used to measure conventional "risk" is 
not calibrated to "risk" in the context of risk-sensitivity because they are two 
different things, linked only by semantics. This may also elucidate why the 
addiction measures were poor sources for predictive choice patterns, as well as 
why the females within the ovulation group did not demonstrate a greater 
degree of risk-sensitive behavior. "Risk" and "risk-sensitivity" are not analogous 
and therefore it may be disadvantageous to assume that those measures 
predictive of one would be predictive of the other.
A third explanation for why thus far there are no correlates of risk- 
sensitivity and personality is that the correct measure has not yet been identified. 
However, this is the most improbable explanation given that the NEO-PI R has 
been widely used and demonstrated fairly consistent and reliable predictive 
validity for a dramatic array of behaviors (Costa & McCrae, 1992). In addition, 
regarding the addiction measures, admittedly the CAGE has been shown to be a 
poor measure for identifying addiction in college students (e.g. Aertgeerts, 
Buntinx, Bande-Knops, Vandermeulen, Roelantes, Ansoms, & Fevery, 2000; Heck 
& Williams, 1994), the goal in using this measures was to find a general and brief 
instrument to correlate use and non-use with risk-sensitive behavior. The CAGE
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was also successful in predicting alcohol use with neurotic personalities, which is 
consistent with the literature (McCormick, Dowd, Quirk, & Hernando Zegarra, 
1998). A problem with this general approach to identifying use rather than 
addiction is that among college students it can be problematic in accurately 
identifying stable use from situational use brought on by initial college 
experience. In addition, our sample as a group did not report problem use 
( M aico h o i=:1 . 1 2 ,  Mcaffeine=1.03, M t o b a c c o = l - 1 3 )  for any one of the addictive substances. 
So the failure in predicting risk-sensitivity by substance use may be attributable 
to our measure selection, lack of problem use, or again addiction may not be a 
predictor of risk-sensitive behavior.
Although the current investigation of risk-sensitivity did extract risk- 
sensitive behavior from both males and females (although only in the negative 
budget) it is still meaningful to refine our current methods. One way to do this 
may be to manipulate delay rather than points. Manipulating delay may provide 
a perceived opportunity to get out of the study early, assuming the participants 
are only engaging in the study to fulfill a credit requirement, not because the 
research in and of itself is so rewarding. This is a reasonable alteration to the 
methods given that such theories like scalar expectancy theory (SET) predict that 
differences exist depending upon what unit of energy is manipulated. When 
variability occurs in food amount (applied to humans, money or points for 
money), risk-aversion is expected, when variability is in delay, risk-prone 
behavior is expected. Utilizing a more salient unit of energy should distill risk-
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sensitivity for females and in the direction consistent with the first hypothesis. 
Investigating parental influence, substance use (alcohol and tobacco), and 
ovulation may be more meaningful with a procedure that is better able to pull 
female risk-sensitive behavior within both positive and negative budgets. To this 
end, replacing variable and constant points-for money with variable and 
constant delays between trials could be manipulated. An inter-trial interval 
would be presented following the selection of each choice and a timer counting 
down seconds to the next trial would make the delay relevant A constant 
number of points would be earned for each choice option (as opposed to constant 
verses variable), but the perception of earning more points would be revealed in 
speed to complete the task rather than discriminating between points earned.
The modification to the current procedure would be minimal but could have a 
considerable impact on the perceptual relevance of the task for participants.
Despite the lack of support for the fifth hypothesis, it is still meaningful to 
pursue a predictive measure of risk-preference. Even if other personality 
measures are not predictive of risk-sensitive behavior this failure would provide 
further support for the ecological and evolutionary models of risk sensitivity, 
which is that it is not attributable to personality constructs.
It is relevant to investigate risk-sensitivity in humans, as much of our 
behavior is dictated by the estimation of the cost-benefits of a given choice. 
Further insight into the mechanism and proclivity males and females may have 
for differing risk situations could facilitate greater understanding and additional
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research within the context of gambling, economics, addiction, and cognition. 
Further examination of choice behavior must be addressed before conclusive 
statements can be made concerning risk-sensitivity and the applicability of the 
daily energy budget model to human behavior. The inclusion of a personality 
measure that may provide some predictive domains of risk-preference may lend 
further insight into the areas of addiction, impulsivity, and may confirm those 
conditions individuals with impulse control problems and addictions will be 
most vulnerable. If problems concerning addiction and self-control are the 
consequence of predisposed, biological constructs, better treatment plans may be 
developed to care for and deter further problem behaviors.
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Table 1
Risk Prone Choice Proportions for Males and Females
Sex and Budget Condition n
Proportion of 
Risk-Prone 
Choices
SEM One-sample
t-value
Positive Budget 44 .42 .039 -2.42*
Males
Negative Budget 46 .55 .018 2.97**
Positive Budget 79 .48 .023 .023
Females
Negative Budget 66 .46 .019 -2.088*
Note. *p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table 2
Cronbach Alpha Reliabilities for Combined NEO-PI R Form S
Domain Scores Cronbach's a Mean Std. Dev.
Neuroticism .87 92.74 18.10
Extraversion .83 116.80 17.10
Openness to Experience .81 118.71 19.38
Agreeableness .86 115.38 17.44
Conscientiousness .88 111.18 18.84
CAGEAicohoi .57 1.12 1.17
CAGETobacco .78 1.13 1.40
CAGEcaffeine .61 1.03 1.13
Note. Combined N = 235.
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Table 3
Correlations: NEO-PI R and Proportion of Risk-Prone (RP) Choices
Domain Scores Sex
Proportion RP Choices 
Pearson's r
Males -.030
Neuroticism Females .062
Combined .016
Males -.065
Extraversion Females -.034
Combined -.049
Males -.116
Openness to Experience Females -.087
Combined -.100
Males -.069
Agreeableness Females .103
Combined .238
Males -.172
Conscientiousness Females -.072
Combined -.109
Note. Nmales ~ 90, Nfemales ~~ 145, Ncombined — 235. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 4
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Domain Scores
Domains Scores Sex Means Std. SEM
Neuroticism Males 88.79 18.02 1.90
Females 95.19 17.80 1.48
Combined 92.74 18.10 1.18
Extraversion Males 115.93 17.81 1.88
Females 117.34 16.68 1.38
Combined 116.80 17.10 1.12
Openness Males 118.39 21.21 2.23
Females 118.91 18.22 1.51
Combined 118.71 19.38 1.26
Agreeableness Males 109.92 14.97 1.58
Females 118.77 18.05 1.50
Combined 115.38 17.44 1.14
Conscientiousness Males 111.28 17.72 1.87
Females 111.12 19.57 1.63
Combined 111.18 18.84 1.23
Note. Nmales 90, Nfemales ~~ 145, Ncombined— 235.
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Table 5
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Neuroticism Facet Scores
Facet Score Sex Means Std. SEM
Nl: Anxiety Males 15.53 4.50 .475
Females 17.90 4.37 .363
Combined 16.99 4.56 .297
N2: Angry Hostility Males 14.46 4.67 .492
Females 14.607 4.53 .376
Combined 14.55 4.58 .299
N3: Depression Males 14.53 4.56 .481
Females 15.60 5.68 .472
Combined 15.19 5.30 .346
N4: Self-Consciousness Males 14.70 4.10 .432
Females 16.01 4.35 .361
Combined 15.51 4.30 .280
N5: Impulsiveness Males 18.37 4.40 .464
Females 18.66 3.98 .330
Combined 18.54 4.14 .270
N6: Vulnerability Males 11.16 3.48 .367
Females 12.49 3.80 .316
Combined 11.98 3.73 .243
Note. Nmales — 90, Nfemales 145, Ncombined ~ 235.
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Table 6
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Extraversion Facet Scores
Facet Score Sex Means Std. SEM
El: Warmth Males 21.96 4.116 .434
Females 23.01 3.85 .32
Combined 22.61 3.98 .260
E2: Gregariousness Males 17.10 5.05 .533
Females 17.99 4.76 .395
Combined 17.65 4.88 .319
E3: Assertiveness Males 16.99 4.58 .483
Females 16.10 4.95 .411
Combined 16.44 4.82 .315
E4: Activity Males 18.00 3.64 .383
Females 18.00 3.55 .295
Combined 18.00 3.58 .233
E5: Excitement-Seeking Males 21.62 3.86 .406
Females 20.31 4.81 .400
Combined 20.81 4.51 .294
E6: Positive Emotions Males 20.27 4.58 .482
Females 21.92 4.60 .382
Combined 21.29 4.65 .303
Note. Nmales ~ 90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined ~ 235.
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Table 7
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Openness Facet Scores
Facet Score Sex Means Std. SEM
Ol: Fantasy Males 20.78 4.70 .496
Females 20.26 4.76 .395
Combined 20.46 4.74 4.74
02: Aesthetics Males 17.61 5.99 .632
Females 19.60 5.64 .468
Combined 18.84 5.84 .381
03: Feelings Males 21.80 4.63 .488
Females 22.54 3.75 .311
Combined 22.26 4.11 .268
04: Actions Males 16.56 3.84 .405
Females 16.17 3.76 .312
Combined 16.31 4.79 3.79
05: Ideas Males 20.74 5.20 .548
Females 18.63 5.40 .449
Combined 19.44 5.41 .353
06: Values Males 20.90 4.82 .508
Females 21.72 4.06 .337
Combined 21.41 4.37 .285
Note. Nmales 90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined ~ 235.
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Table 8
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Agreeableness Facet Scores
Facet Score Sex Means Std. SEM
Al: Trust Males 18.61 4.42 .466
Females 19.56 4.92 .409
Combined 19.20 4.75 .310
A2: Straightforwardness Males 17.18 3.99 .421
Females 19.48 4.74 .394
Combined 18.60 4.60 .300
A3: Altruism Males 22.60 3.46 .365
Females 23.66 3.87 .322
Combined 23.25 3.75 .245
A4: Compliance Males 15.48 3.85 .406
Females 16.63 4.63 .384
Combined 16.19 4.37 .285
A5: Modesty Males 17.12 4.49 .474
Females 19.44 4.198 .349
Combined 18.55 4.45 .290
A6: Tender-Mindedness Males 18.93 4.091 .431
Females 20.01 3.75 .312
Combined 19.60 3.91 .255
Note. Nmales ~ 90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined — 235.
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Table 9
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Conscientiousness Facet Scores
Facet Score Sex Means Std. SEM
Cl: Competence Males 20.71 3.38 .360
Females 19.86 4.06 .337
Combined 20.19 3.83 .250
C2: Order Males 17.71 4.52 .480
Females 17.66 5.30 .440
Combined 17.68 5.00 .326
C3: Dutifulness Males 20.54 4.25 .448
Females 20.50 3.87 .322
Combined 20.51 4.01 .262
C4: Achievement Setting Males 18.51 3.92 .413
Females 18.76 4.40 .365
Combined 18.66 4.21 .275
C5: Self-Discipline Males 18.26 4.15 .437
Females 18.32 4.84 .402
Combined 18.29 4.58 .299
C6: Deliberation Males 15.54 4.19 .441
Females 16.03 4.27 .355
Combined 15.84 4.24 .276
Note. Nmales ~ 90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined — 235.
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Table 10
Frequencies for the Post-Experimental Questionnaire
Interest in the Task 
(Engaging) Mean
SEM
2.11 .114
Males
2.28 .102
2.15 .077
Females
2.23 .087
Motivation Mean SEM(Money)
2.02 .110
Males
1.93 .118
1.92 .078
Females
2.23 .078
Motivation Mean SEM(Competitor)
1.70 .106
Males
2.04 .108
1.81 .079
Females
2.14 .090
Note. Nmales — 90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined -  235.
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Table 11
Independent Samples t-test for response to the CAGE and risk-prone choices
Group N Proportion 
RP Choices
SEM One sample 
t-value
Males
Clinical 34 .51 .024 -.886
Alcohol
Nonclinical 56 .48 .027 -.886
Clinical 35 .52 .027 -1.193
Tobacco
Nonclinical 55 55 .47 .027
Clinical 23 .53 .024 -1.32
Caffeine
Nonclinical 67 .48 .024 -1.32
Females
Clinical 48 .47 .024 .211
Alcohol
Nonclinical 97 .47 .018 .211
Clinical 42 .46 .032 .736
Tobacco
Nonclinical 103 .48 .015 .736
Clinical 49 .49 .027 -.832
Caffeine
Nonclinical 96 .46 .017 -.832
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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Figure 1
Proportion of Risk-Prone (RP) Choices by Males and Females 
Under a Positive and Negative Energy Budget
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Figure 2 
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INSTRUCTIONS
Once you start the program, you will be presented with set of practice trials. 
During these trials, a yellow OR a blue choice box will be visible. These two 
choice options yield differing point values. All you have to do is move the 
cursor with your joystick to the choice box until a point value is shown. The 
practice trials will only present you with one choice box (yellow or blue) at a 
time and none of the points will be incrementing. These trials are in place in an 
effort to familiarize you with the different point values of each choice selection. 
After 10 trials, you will be presented with another instruction screen.
The second instruction screen will signal the start of the free-choice trials, your 
points will increment for each choice and you will be competing with another 
student.
If you have questions, please ask the researcher now to clarify, if not please move 
the cursor to the "start program" icon to begin.
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Instructions for the Free-Choice Trials
INSTRUCTIONS
Now that you have been exposed to the two choice options, you will be asked to 
connect to the Internet to compete with a student from a participating college. In 
this part of the study, you will again select one of the two choice boxes in each 
trial. Again the two boxes will represent either a variable point amount of 1 or 5, 
or a constant amount of 3, just like in the forced choice trials. The goal of the 
game is to increment as many points as you can. You will be able to determine 
where you are (winning, losing, or even) relative to your competitor via a status 
barometer along the right side of the experimental screen. Whoever wins the 
game will receive a MONETARY PRIZE provided by a grant funded by the 
National Psychological Community (NPC).
All of the sign-up times, including yours were paired with sign-up times from 
the participating University. Given the variability with which students arrive to 
their appointment, there may be a brief delay while your competitor completes 
the forced choice trials, reads the instructions, and logs on the Internet. Please be 
patient. Your game id number will be your participant number and the 
abbreviation "UM" for the University of Montana. Your competitor will have the 
same participant number, but with a different college abbreviation. When you 
have read and understand these instructions, log on by moving the cursor to the 
"connect" button at the bottom of the screen.
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Appreciation Screen
Thank you for your participation!
You will receive two experimental credits for your involvement in this 
study. Before you leave, please complete our questionnaires, and wait for the 
post-experimental debriefing. YOU ARE EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN THE 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIS TASK! Please do not discuss any aspect of this 
experiment with your peers. Thank you & enjoy your day!
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Free-Choice Screen
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